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Contingent Democratization: When Does Economic Crisis Matter? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
It has been argued that economic crisis is a trigger for democratic transition, but empirical 
evidence is limited and mixed.  We argue that the political effect of economic crisis is 
contingent on economic structure, specifically, the share of economic assets of authoritarian 
elites in the national economy.  A higher level of the state engagement in the economy 
makes social forces dependent on the ruling elites for their patrimonial interests and, 
therefore, the authoritarian regime liable for economic failure.  Moreover, a higher share of 
the state-owned economic assets aggravates the economic loss of both the business class and 
the mass upon economic crisis.  As a result, state economic engagement makes the business 
class more likely to defect from the coalition with political elites, the mass more likely to 
revolt for regime change, and the two social classes are more likely to form cross-class 
alliance against the regime.  Cross-national analyses show that economic crisis triggers 
democratic transition in authoritarian countries only when the share of the state economy (i.e., 
public investment) is above certain level. 
 
Keywords: Economic crisis, Democratization, The State, Coalition, Legitimacy 
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Contingent Democratization: When Does Economic Crisis Matter? 
 
Introduction 
Economic crisis has been widely accepted as a key trigger of democratic transition.1  This 
belief is based on two lines of arguments.  The first argument, ³coalition thesis,´ is an 
elite-based approach and contends that economic crisis breaks down the ruling coalition of 
authoritarian regime by depleting the resources that the regime had relied on to pay allies of 
the business elites, the middle class, or the organized labor forces.  The second line of 
argument, ³legitimacy thesis,´FRQWHQGs from a mass-based approach that economic crisis 
undermines the legitimacy basis of authoritarian regimes.2  This is primarily because 
authoritarian regimes rely heavily on economic performance for public support and claim to 
UXOH³JHQHUDOO\EDVHGXSRQVRFLRHFRQRPLFSHUIRUPDQFHRUZKDWKDVEHHQFDOOHGµVRFLDO
HXGDHPRQLF¶OHJLWLPDWLRQ.´3 
A brief scan of post-war history, however, shows that the actual political consequence of 
economic shock varies.  Although the breakdown of authoritarian regimes and the transition 
to democracy have been preceded with economic turmoil in a number of countries, economic 
crisis in many cases did not lead to regime change, let alone democratic transition.  For 
example, while Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and some other Latin American countries 
experienced democratic transition during economic crisis, many African authoritarian rulers 
OLNH=LPEDEZH¶V0XJDEHDQG7RJR¶V(\DGHPDPDQDJHGWRVWD\LQSRZHUduring the 
                                                             
1 Gourevitch, 1986; Markoff and Duncan Baretta 1990; Richard 1986; Haggard and Kaufman 
1995; Haggard and Kaufman 1997; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Geddes, 1999; Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2001. Zak and Feng 2003. 
2 Gasiorowski 1995, 884. Also see Epstein 1984; Linz and Stepan 1996. 
3 White 1986, 463. Also see Duch 1995; Remmer 1996; Chen 2004; Smith 2006, 57. 
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protracted economic crisis.4  In two neighboring Asian countries, ,QGRQHVLD¶V6XKDUWR¶V
regime collapsed during Asian financial crisis of 1998, but 0DOD\VLD¶V0DKDWLU¶VUHLQVWD\HG
intact until 2003.5  As one of the few systematic studies on this particular issue, Gasirowski 
found that while economic crises help trigger democratic breakdown, they had no definite 
effect on democratic transition.6  In a word, scholars have not found a consistent pattern 
regarding the relationship between economic crisis and democratic transition. 
Under what conditions is economic crisis more likely to cause democratic transition?  
This study answers this question by highlighting the importance of economic structure under 
authoritarian rule.  We argue that whether or not economic crisis engenders democratic 
transition is conditioned by the economic engagement of the authoritarian state.  The 
economic engagement of the state increases the probability of democratic transition upon 
economic crisis for two reasons.  First, state economic engagement politicizes the economy 
and economic crisis by making the authoritarian regime liable for economic failure.  It 
amplifies the effect of both coalition-driven and legitimacy-driven democratic transition.  
While the economic engagement of the state helps the regime during economic boom, various 
social forces find it more imperative to change political system when the economy turns bad.  
Second, state engagement in the economy aggravates the economic loss for both the business 
class and the mass upon economic crisis.  This is because as the stakeholders of the state 
economy, the ruling elites have both the incentives and capacities to preserve the return from 
the state business at the expense of non-state classes.  With a formal proof, we clarify that 
                                                             
4 Wright 2010. 
5 Pepinsky 2009. 
6 Gasiorowski 1995. 
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given an economic shock, a higher share of the state economy entails a greater disparity in 
terms of economic loss between political elites and social forces (i.e., economic elites and the 
mass).  As a consequence, when crisis happens, economic elites are more likely to defect 
from the coalition with the regime; the mass are more likely to withdraw support for the 
regime and engage in revolt for political change; and, finally, the economic/business elites 
and the mass are more likely to form cross-class alliance against the authoritarian regime. 
We test the conditionality of the effect of economic crisis as determined by state 
economic engagement by analyzing panel data of 106 countries during 1970-2007.  Our 
empirical analyses consistently show that economic crisis is significantly and positively 
associated with democratic transition only when the level of the state engagement (measured 
as the percentage of public investment) is relatively high.  This finding is robust not only 
against different measurements of democracy and economic crisis, but also against different 
model specifications that include an analysis excluding oil export countries and analyses that 
control region patterns and time trends. 
This research contributes to literature in two regards.  First, it expands the pool of the 
theories and facts of the economic origins of democracy by highlighting how short-term 
economic shock intersects with long-term economic structure in triggering democratic 
transition.  The structuralist tradition of comparative democratization literature has paid 
most scholarly attention to economic factors such as economic development and economic 
inequality.7  The effect of short-term economic shock on democratic transition has been 
relatively less studied.  Second, it enriches the understanding of the economic role of the 
                                                             
7 Lipset, 1959; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Barro 1999; Boix and Stokes 2003; Epstein et 
al. 2006; Acemoglu et al. 2008; Houle 2009; Ansell and Samuels 2010. 
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state.  The economic implications of the variant roles of the state have been thoroughly 
discussed.8  Their political implications, however, have received much less attention.  This 
study implies that state engagement in the economy does not only make a difference in 
economic output.  It also shapes the incentives of different political actors, which in turn 
leads to variant political equilibriums when crisis hits. 
 
The Relevance of the Economic Engagement of the State 
Scholars have long noticed the impact of the economic role of the state on economic 
performance.  The literature of varieties of capitalism has found that advanced industrialized 
democracies vary substantially with regard to the extent of the state engagement in their 
national economy.9  In regards to developing countries, the variation of the role of the state 
in the economy is even larger.  A plethora of literature suggests that the states have been 
playing different role in economic development across developing countries during the 
post-war period.10  The states of developing countries get involved in economic production 
for various reasons.  Most notably, elites in late developers believed that state engagement 
was necessary to jumpstart the economy and provide protection to infant national industries.  
Those countries faced a tough international environment of economic competition in which 
the production is already industrialized and differentiated, the global market is highly 
integrated, and the domestic market is subject to the invasion of global capital.11  National 
private businesses cannot accumulate capital and strength independently.  Secondly, many 
                                                             
8 Wade 1990; Evans 1995; Kohli 2004; Acemoglu 2005. 
9 Hall and Soskice 2001; Streeck and Yamamura 2003. 
10 North 1981; Migdal 1988; Wade 1990; Evans 1995; Kohli 2004. 
11 Gerschenkron 1962. 
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developing countries that are dependent on natural resources have often seen a high degree of 
state engagement in economic sectors.  Nationalist sentiment and the push by domestic 
forces for national control over natural resource in the post-war period have caused the states 
in a number of countries to become the biggest stakeholders in their economies.  Finally, the 
state was closely tied to economic production in communist countries.  In those countries, 
the state directly owned a large portion of economic resources and enterprises. 
Whatever the reasons behind state economic engagement, aside from its apparent impact 
on the economy, its very existence entails important political implications.  This study in 
particular explores how the state share in the economy influences the relationship between 
economic crisis and democratization.  The following two subsections explicate two reasons 
to argue that the economic engagement of the state makes economic crisis more likely to 
engender political transition in authoritarian countries. 
 
State engagement and politicized crisis 
State engagement increases the probability of democratic transition after economic crisis first 
because a higher economic stake of authoritarian elites amplifies the effect of both coalition 
mechanism and legitimacy mechanism of crisis-engendered democratization as presumed by 
extant theories.  Coalition thesis contends that the most direct consequence of economic 
contraction is the depletion of the resources that the regime can use to maintain ruling 
coalition.  Economic crisis thus reduces the bargaining power and the ability of political 
elites to provide supporters with accesses to opportunities and resources.12  This line of 
                                                             
12  Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Haggard and Kaufman 1997. 
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argument in fact presumes that there had been an effective coalition between economic elites 
and political elites before crisis and the state does rely on economic spoils for economic elites 
and their cooperation for authoritarian rule.  Under the authoritarian rule, the most effective 
way for the state to build the ruling coalition with non-regime elites, especially economic 
elites, is to monopolize economic resources, run the economic production, or manage the 
economy.  Through an active engagement, the state is able to secure the material basis that it 
can use to provide selective rents and benefits to supporters among the social forces, 
especially the business groups.13 
A close relationship between authoritarian elites and economic elites serves to the benefit 
of the regime during economic boom.  However, it is the same relationship that can put the 
fate of the authoritarian regime in danger during economic bust.  Business elites would hold 
the regime accountable for the economic failure and thus seek to alter political arrangements.  
During the financial crisis of early 1980s, for example, ³WKHEXVLQHVVLQWHUHVWVDQGIRUHLJQ
investors that had rallied to authoritarian military regimes in the 1960s (in Latin America) 
began to see these overly statist and apparently unaccountable governments as a source of 
danger rather than of protection, so they withdrew their support.´14  This reasoning for 
authoritarian collapse conforms to the history of African countries as well, where economic 
contraction in late 1980s has facilitated democratization in countries like Benin and 
Zambia.15  Only with a certain level of the engagement of the state, can the business elites 
find the state necessary for their economic benefit and politics relevant in their economic 
                                                             
13  Remmer 1999; Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2005. 
14 Whitehead 1993, 314. 
15 Joseph 1997. 
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returns.  For the same reason, when crisis happens can they find the need to change politics. 
From a more mass-based approach, legitimacy thesis contends that economic crisis 
undermines the legitimacy basis of regimes, but especially that of authoritarian ones.16  A 
key conclusion emerged from studies of popular support suggests that the impact of 
economic performance on regime durability is strongly moderated by political institutions.17  
The greater competitive opportunities tend to make economic performance less important.  
Democratic regimes are therefore inherently less vulnerable to economic performance 
setbacks than their authoritarian counterparts.  Authoritarian regimes, lacking power sharing 
and government alteration, rely heavily on economic performance for public support.  And 
citizens under authoritarian rule tend to associate economic performance with regime 
legitimacy and do not differentiate between exogenous shocks and good economic 
management (competence) when assessing the effect of economic growth on their incomes.18  
The centrality of this instrumental rationale in political support thus makes authoritarian 
regimes vulnerable to economic downturns. 
Authoritarian vulnerability to economic downturns is further reinforced by the very 
existence of the engagement of the state in the economy.  Like China, Vietnam, and 
Singapore, in authoritarian countries where the state is considerably engaged in economic 
activities, the regime is more likely to attribute economic success to its governance and boast 
its effectiveness and legitimacy based on extraordinary economic performance.  At the same 
time, due to the state economic engagement, the income of ordinary citizens is more likely to 
                                                             
16 Epstein 1984; Resler and Kanet, 1993 Gasiorowski 1995, 884; Linz and Stepan 1996; Zak 
and Feng 2003. 
17 Remmer 1996; Anderson and Guillory 1997; Norris 1999.   
18 Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen 1997.  
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be influenced by how well the state executes economic productions and they thus are more 
likely to associate their political attitudes with economic wellbeing.  As various country 
studies have shown in such authoritarian countries when the economy does develop well, 
citizens extend relatively high levels of political support to regime.  However, the other side 
of the strengthened tie between economic performance and legitimacy basis is that it 
reinforces the instrumental rationale of the citizens in their evaluation of the regime and 
makes the regime stability more sensitive to economic situation.  When economic crisis 
happens and the government stops delivering economic benefits based on which the ordinary 
people extend their support, the regime becomes politically liable for their economic 
misfortune.  For this reason, compared to regimes that has been less engaged in economic 
sectors, those that are more engaged cannot afford an economic crisis that is often not in their 
control. 
In sum, for both the business elites and the mass, if the state plays a minimal role in the 
economy, the state is either irrelevant or too weak to be useful.  The potential gains from 
political actions are therefore insignificant.  In other words, if there is no state engagement, 
regime change is hardly a viable solution to economic problems.  As the critics of economic 
liberalization have observed, the free-market in authoritarian countries or new democracies 
leads to the atomization of social interests by putting them in competition with each other and 
the depoliticization of social economic development by cutting the scope and hence the 
relevance of policy decisions.19  In essence, in a relatively state-free economy, political 
change is not necessary because politics is not perceived as the cause of economic failure.  
                                                             
19 Oxhom and Ducatenzeiler 1998; Kurtz 2004. 
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In such a condition, the political interest for democracy, even given an economic crisis, 
would be difficult to emerge, organize, and persist. 
 
The State Economy, Business Defection, Mass Revolt, and Cross-Class Alliance 
If a significant portion of the economy is run or operated by the authoritarian state, economic 
crisis not only will disrupt the dependence relationship between the state and various social 
forces, but also, more critically, causes a greater disparity between economic loss of state 
elites and that of social classes (i.e. economic elites or business class and the mass).  
Compared to political elites, non-state classes take a disproportionably greater hit upon 
economic crisis because political elites have the incentives and advantageous status to 
preserve their economic interest or mitigate economic loss.  We in this subsection prove that 
with a higher share of the economy of the state elites, this disadvantage is even greater 
because the stakeholders of the privileged economy are more motivated and more able to 
protect their economic returns and in fact shift their loss to the business class and the mass.  
Furthermore, higher levels of the state economy tend to reduce the relative income gap 
between the two social classes upon economic crisis and hence help remove barriers for 
cross-class alliance.  We build a theoretical model to prove that economic crisis is a trigger 
that disrupts the existing equilibrium and facilitates democratization by making: (1) business 
class more likely to defect from the coalition with political elites, (2) the mass more likely to 
revolt for regime change, and, (3) the two forces more likely to form cross-class alliance 
against the regime. 
Given the existence of the state assets, there are two kinds of people in the society, the 
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mass (m) and the privileged (p), as defined by their access to the revenues generated by the 
state-owned assets, G.  Among the privileged there are two discernable groups, the political 
elite (e) and the economic elite or business class (b), defined by their power to distribute the 
revenues generated by the state-owned assets.  By differentiating between economic elites 
and political elites, our model differs from the conventional elite-mass (or rich-poor) 
two-player models and thus highlights the critical role of the state in the economy.20  Since 
political elites have a dual motivation to maximize their material interest and maintain a 
ruling coalition, they take a fixed amount (K) from the revenues generated by the state-owned 
assets and provide the business with an amount (R) of the revenues as rent.  We assume K > 
R since the wealth generated from the privileged assets is held more by political elites than by 
the business class. 
 We further denote D  as the income share of the privileged among the total income, E  
as the population share of the privileged (p) among all population N, T  as the elite income 
share within the privileged, G as the population share of the elite (e) among the privileged 
population Np, y  as the average income for everyone in the economy based on a constant 
technology, and py as the average income among the privileged.  Given the social 
stratification as well as unequal access to decision power over state-owned assets, we further 
assume
1
2
D ! , 1
2
E  , 1
2
T ! , and 1
2
G  , capturing the key characteristics of an authoritarian 
regime.  Based upon these specifications, we have the per capita income for the mass 
1
1
my y
D
E
  , the privileged 
py y g
D
E  , the political elites 
e
py y k
T
G  , and business 
                                                             
20 Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robison 2005. 
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class 
1
1
b
py y r
T
G
  . 
 
A. Provision Pact and Coalition Defection 
Few dictators can govern alone.21  During normal times, political elites maintain a ruling 
coalition with economic elites through providing the latter with a share of return from the 
state-owned assets.  In this subsection, we find out the condition for economic elites to 
break away from the coalition with political elites after economic crisis.  The following 
proof shows that a sudden economic shock disrupts the previous equilibrium, and with a 
higher share of state-owned assets, economic crisis is more likely to trigger coalition 
defection. 
 Suppose an economic crisis happens in a country, it affects the mass and business class 
alike by decreasing their respective income byO .  Due to the greater capability of political 
elites to protect returns from the state economy, political elites suffer a less degree of loss.  
For simplification, we set economic crisis does not affect the income of political elites.  As 
for the business class, they have an option to engage in a coalition defection with a cost of 
defection P .  If successful, the business class will appropriate the income of the elites and 
distribute among themselves.  The defection constraint for business class is that the per 
capita business income after successful defection and after discounting cost is higher than the 
per capita business income under authoritarian coalition and without defection cost.   
 
  1 es bs bsy y yP  !
                                       (1)
 
To satisfy this defection constraint, we find out that the following three conditions are 
                                                             
21 Boix and Svolik 2013. 
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required.22 First,1 0P G  ! , that is, the destruction of defection is less than the population 
share of the business class within the privileged.  Were it to happen, this can be regarded as 
a catastrophic defection.  Second, 2 1 0T  ! , that is, income share of political elites among 
the privileged is more than a half, which is true by assumption.  Third, 
 
kd > r 1-d( ).  
That is, the distribution of total privileged income among the privileged is that the mean 
political elite dividend is more than the mean business rent.  This is also true by assumption, 
K > R.  In sum, the three conditions suggest that as long as the coalition defection is not 
self-destructive for the business class, they are motivated to break away from the existing 
coalition with political elites when there is an economic crisis.  
 We further find out how the share of the state-owned assets in the national economy is 
associated with the defection constraint for business class.  Suppose there are two countries 
that are otherwise identical, but one has a larger privileged economy than another, G1 < G2.  
At the per capita level, we have for scenario 1
G
, 
 1 1 1k rG G!  , and for scenario 2G , 
 2 2 1k rG G!  .  We find out whether  2 2 1k rG G!   is more likely to hold than 
 1 1 1k rG G!  .  This is true since the condition of  1k rG G!   is equivalent to K R! .  
It suggests that when political elites take most of the returns generated by the state-owned 
economy, higher shares of state economy in the national economy make the business elites 
more likely to defect from coalition with the regime when economic crisis happens.  This is 
so because compared to political elites, business elites suffer a greater degree of loss in such a 
situation than otherwise and they attribute this disproportional loss to the interference of 
political elites in the economy. 
                                                             
22 For a complete proof of the theoretical model of this research, see Appendix 1. 
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B. Social Pact and Mass Rebellion 
In this part we show the revolt constraint for the mass upon economic crisis.  Again, 
economic crisis affects the mass and business class alike, by decreasing their respective 
income byO .  But economic crisis will not affect the income of the elites.  Revolt is 
participated by the mass, and if successful, the mass will appropriate the income that belongs 
to the privileged.  However, revolt will destroy a mP  ( 0 1mP  ) portion of all income that 
the poor will receive.  The rebellion constraint for the mass obtains when the per capita 
income of mass after a successful revolt and after discounting the cost is higher than the per 
capita mass income under the current regime.   
 
  1 ms ps msm y y yP  !                                      (2) 
After expansion and substitution, we get this relationship: 
(1 )(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 )
(1 )(1 )(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 ) 0
p m m p m
m m
y k y
r y
T P G E G P G E G P T O
G P G E O G P G D O
          
         !
(3) 
We are able to prove that if given the no-catastrophe condition, 
1
1
2
m m mP P P !  
, this 
relationship holds.  That is, similar to our conclusion about the coalition defection constraint 
for the business class, as long as the rebellion is not self-destructive, the mass is motivated by 
economic crisis to revolt against the privileged when crisis happens.
 
We further show how the extent of state economic engagement makes a difference in the 
motivation of the mass to revolt.  That is, we would like to know whether a greater G makes 
(3) more likely to be true.  This is so because a greater G means a greater k or r with a 
constant population composition, which makes the left side of the inequality (3) greater.  
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Therefore, this proof suggests that with a higher share of state economy and resultant greater 
advantage of the privileged classes, economic crisis is more likely to induce the mass to 
revolt for political change.
 
 
C. Cross-Class Alliance between the Mass and Business Class 
Democracy does not naturally follow business defection or mass revolt.  Economic elites 
might turn to an oligarch in which they dictate; the mass might establish a socialist system.  
Although we are not seeking for necessary and sufficient condition for democratic transition, 
we believe that democracy is more likely to happen when the social forces, i.e. business elites 
and the mass, are more willing to cooperate with each other in their power struggle against 
political elites.  In this subsection, we want to show whether economic crisis increases the 
willingness of cooperation between two social classes and how the shares of the state 
economy further increases the probability of cross-class alliance upon crisis. 
Once an economic crisis happens, first, the inequality level between mass and business 
class will change.  The post-crisis inequality level will become: 
bs
s
bs ms
Y
Y Y
K  
                                                      (4) 
    
As shown in Appendix 1, 
0
sd
d
K
O                                              (5)
 
That is, given the participation of the state in the economy, as economic crisis increases in 
severity, inequality between business class and the mass declines.  Various prominent 
studies have argued and found that as inequality between the rich (economic elites in this 
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model) and the poor (the mass) decreases, the probability of democratic transition increases.23 
We are further able to provide an alternative proof that economic crisis and ensuing 
decreased inequality between business class and the mass increase the willingness of the two 
social classes to ally with each other.  The condition for alliance is that after a crisis when 
the combined (per capita) payoff for cross-class alliance is greater than the combined (per 
capita) payoff for business class and mass under the authoritarian regime given the cost of 
cross-class alliance, cP . 
(1 )
(1 )
bs ms
c
m b m b
Y Y Y
N N N N
OP   ! 
                                     (6)
 
This inequality is assured if we assume, first,
(1 )
(1 )c c
g r
G
P OP
!   , which is almost always true 
considering the fact that r is a fraction of g, and second, 1
c
TDP O  .  This means that as long 
as the cross-class alliance cost is not prohibitively high, the cross-class alliance constraint is 
binding. 
We finally examine whether a higher share of the state economy and a greater extent of 
economic exploitation of the political elites make the cross-class alliance constraint more 
binding upon crisis.  Intuitively, this can be understood the following way.  A larger share 
of state assets means more wealth to the political elites.  And tKHODUJHUWKHHOLWHV¶SULYLOHJHG
wealth, the larger the returns and greater incentive to form cross class alliance for the mass 
and the economic elites, with whatever arrangement to share the returns between the two 
classes. 
Formally, from (6), we take the first order derivative w.r.t. k, and we have 
                                                             
23
Boix and Stokes 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2005
 
17 
 
(1 )(1 ) 0c N NP O EG OG E   !                            (7) 
This first order condition suggests that the higher the state economy (as represented by a 
bigger size of political elite¶s take from the privileged assets), the more binding is the 
cross-class alliance constraint. 
 
Variables, measurement, and data 
Political democracy 
Since much of our theoretical argument pertains to political change from autocracy to 
democracy, we follow the standard practice in the field and use a dichotomous measurement 
of democracy.  In most of our analyses, we use the measurement provided in the dataset 
³'HPRFUDF\DQG'LFWDWRUVKLS´NQRZQ DV''''LVXSGDWHGIURPWKH³3ROLWLFDODQG
(FRQRPLF'DWDEDVH´RULJLQDOO\SURGXFHGE\3U]HZRUVNL et al.24  DD categorizes a polity as 
democracy if the executive is elected via the legislature or the legislature is directly elected, 
there is more than one party, and the executive power alternates. 
As a robustness check, we also use Polity IV measurement of democracy in a set of 
analyses.  The original Polity score is a 21-point (from -10 to 10) scale that quantifies five 
institutional aspects of democracy: competitiveness of participation, regulation of 
participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, 
and constraints on chief executive.  We generate a dichotomous indicator by categorizing a 
country with a Polity score of 6 or higher as a democracy (1-democracy; 0-autocracy).  The 
summary statistics of this variable and other variables are reported in Appendix 2. 
                                                             
24 Alvarez et al. 2000. 
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Economic crisis 
We measure economic crisis in various ways to ensure that our analyses are not driven by a 
particular measurement.  We first follow a standard practice in the field measuring crisis as 
the two-year backward moving average of the growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
per capita (Gasiorowski, 1995), that is, the average of the growth rate of last two years.  The 
lag value helps alleviate potential endogeneity problem in the relationship between economic 
crisis and political transition.  We recode this variable such that greater value indicates 
greater extent of economic crisis.  We use this measurement in our main analyses.  Second, 
based on the first measurement, we create a dichotomous measurement of economic crisis 
with 1 indicating that the two-year moving average is negative and 0 indicating that that 
quantity is positive.  This measurement simply tells whether or not a country is in economic 
crisis in a specific year.  Third, we extend the time span of gauging crisis by using the 
three-year moving average of growth rate.  This measurement further ensures that our 
analysis is not influenced by random or unsystematic economic shock of a given year that 
does not reflect the general trend of economic situation of a country.  Lastly, we use the 
length of economic crisis as measured by the number of consecutive years of negative 
economic growth rate before the current year.  Different from the first three measurements 
that gauge the extent of economic crisis, it captures the duration of economic contraction. 
 
State economy 
We measure the extent of the state economy explicated in our theory using the indicator 
³JRYHUQPHQWHQWHUSULVHVDQGLQYHVWPHQW´GUDZQIURPWKHGDWDVHW³Economic Freedom of the 
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World´ (EFW) compiled by the Fraser Institute.  EFW dataset record the percentage of 
government investment (state owned enterprises and public investment) in the national 
economy.  State enterprises and government investment are the most active aspects of a 
VWDWH¶VUROHLQWKHHFRQRP\  6XFKDPHDVXUHPHQWRI³VWDWHHQJDJHPHQW´IRFXVHVRQWKH
participation of the states in actual economic production.  It is not a comprehensive 
measurement that summarizes other relevant aspects of the state role such as strategic 
planning, operational support, absorbing foreign investment, and regulating business 
activities.  We believe that, however, this indicator captures one essential aspect of the stake 
of the state in the economy.  It is an objective dimension that is less problematic for 
measurement.  And its relationship to the crisis-democracy nexus should correlate with the 
relevance of other aspects of the state role.  Most importantly, this dimension of state role 
closely pertains to our theoretical argument.  Our theory in previous sections directly models 
the share of state economy as the conditioning variable that moderates the effect of economic 
crisis on democratic transition.  And the investment of the authoritarian governments serves 
a good proxy of the stake of authoritarian political elites in the economic system and thus 
captures a key feature of authoritarian economic structure.  The missing values of this 
variable are imputed through linearly interpolating (averaging) between the two nearest 
neighboring date points within the same country.  This treatment is based on the 
presumption and the data characteristics that the level of state engagement does not fluctuate 
drastically over adjacent years. 
 
 
20 
 
Control Variables 
We first control the level of economic development. Real GDP per capita is used as the 
measurement.  The data for GDP per capita are acquired from the Penn World Table 
compiled by the Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania.  
Among different measures of GDP per capita, we choose the chain series in 2005 constant 
price.  The distribution of GDP per capita is right skewed and thus is log-transformed into a 
normally distributed variable.  Building on previous quantitative studies of comparative 
democratization, we also include a set of variables to control their confounding effects: ethnic 
fragmentation, percentage of Moslem population (%), British colonial history (0 vs. 1), 
importance of oil export (0 vs. 1), and economic openness measured as the percentage of the 
value of export and import in national GDP.  The summary statistics of all variables is 
presented in Appendix 2.  We also control for regional patterns by including five region 
dummies (six regions: Asia, Africa, Latin America, Middle East, East Europe, and OECD) 
and time factors by including dummies for time including either decade dummies or year 
dummies. 
Mostly limited by the data availability of the state economy variable, the actual sample 
contains 106 countries. The time period expands from 1970 to 2007. 
 
Analyses and results 
Following a series of important studies on democratization, we employ a dynamic probit 
model, Markov transition model, to estimate the effect of economic crisis on democratic 
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transition.25 
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Transition model distinguishes between the probability of moving away from autocracy 
(democratic transition) and the probability of moving away from democracy (democratic 
stability) as decided by the value of yi t-1.  Since our theoretical argument is about 
democratic transition, we focus on the change from yt-1=0 to yt=1, and only report the 
analytical results of the Beta coefficient. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
The results of first set of primary analyses are presented in Table 1.  Model 1-4 are the 
baseline modes that only include primary explanatory variables.  Model 1 shows that the 
coefficient of crisis is positive and statistically significant.  It indicates that economic crisis 
on average is associated with a higher probability of democratic transition.  However, this 
simple aggregate analysis conceals the fact that the positive association between economic 
crisis and democratic transition does not hold for all type of cases.  Splitting the global 
sample based on the share of state economy yields results consistent with our theoretical 
expectation about the conditional effect of economic crisis.  Model 2 analyzes cases where 
the share is above the mean value of the sample (35.7%) and Model 3 analyzes cases with 
                                                             
25 Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Boix and Stokes 2003; Ansell and Samuels 2010; Ahlquist 
and Wibbels 2012. 
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state share below the mean value.  Economic crisis is positively associated with regime 
transition only for cases with relatively higher levels of state engagement in the economy, but 
not for cases with low levels of state engagement.  Model 4 includes an interaction term 
between state economy and economic crisis.  The significant and positive coefficient of the 
interaction term indicates that greater extent of state engagement in the economy increases 
the contribution of economic crisis to democratic transition. 
Model 5-8 conduct the same set of analyses but control for a full set of variables 
including region dummies and decade dummies.  For brevity, the coefficients of dummies 
and the results of simpler models are not reported.  These analyses yield the same pattern 
regarding the significance of the effect of state economy on the relationship between 
economic crisis and democratic transition.  That is, the democratizing effect of economic 
crisis increases with higher levels of state engagement in the economy; economic crisis is 
positively associated with the probability of democratic transition for cases with relatively 
higher levels of state economy, but not significantly associated with that probability with 
relatively lower levels of state economy. 
The interpretation of the significance and magnitude of the effect of economic crisis in 
Table 1 is difficult given the complication of variant scales of variables, the dynamic probit 
model, and the interaction terms.  To make more accurate and informative interpretation, we 
plot in Figure 1 the marginal effect of economic crisis on the probability of regime transition 
for all levels of state economy. Figure 1 displays the marginal effect as the change in the 
probability of democratic transition, at each value of state economy, when the measurement 
of economic crisis moves 1 standard deviation from its mean value.  From the plot, we can 
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tell that first, the democratizing effect of economic crisis increases with the level of the state 
economic engagement. Second, if the state holds a small share of the national economy, the 
effect of economic crisis is insignificant indicating that it does not lead to regime changes in 
this situation.  For cases where the state holds a significant share of the national economy, 
the effect of economic crisis is positive and significant, indicating that it is more likely to 
engender democratic transition in such countries or such time. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Robustness check 
We examine the robustness of our findings first by alternating the measurement of dependent 
variable (i.e., democracy) and independent variable (i.e., economic crisis).  Model 9 and 
Model 10 use Polity IV and split the global sample at the mean value of state share of 
economy. A comparison of the two models shows that economic crisis is not significantly 
associated with democratic transition when the share of the state economy is low and it is 
positively associated with democratic transition when the share is high.  Model 11 using 
Polity measurement includes an interaction term between state share and economic crisis.  
This analysis confirms the pattern that economic crisis is more likely to be positively 
associated with regime transition when the share of state economy is higher. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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We then vary the measurement of economic crisis in different ways.  Model 12 uses a 
dichotomous measurement indicating whether or not there is an economic crisis. It is created 
by recoding the two-year moving of economic growth into 1 (if <0) and 0 (if >0).  Model 13 
measures the duration of economic crisis as the number of consecutive years of negative 
economic growth rate before the current year.  Model 14 measures crisis as the three-year 
moving average of economic growth rate (lag).  All three analyses yield similar pattern 
regarding the moderating effect of state economy.  That is, economic crisis is positively 
associated with democratic transition only with a significant share of the state holding in the 
national economy. 
 Model 15 excludes OECD countries from the analysis.  Model 16 excludes oil 
country-year cases. Some scholars have argued that oil-rich authoritarian regimes are less 
likely to collapse in economic crisis.26  Both analyses also demonstrate the significant and 
positive moderating effect of the state economy on the relationship between economic crisis 
and democratic transition.  All in all, the findings of these robustness analyses (and other 
ones not reported) confirm the theoretical relevance of the economic structure as defined by 
the extent of the state engagement to the political consequence of economic crisis. 
 
Concluding remarks 
For an authoritarian regime to have any significant political change, both triggering events 
that disrupt the original equilibrium under the authoritarian arrangement and certain structural 
factors that magnify the effect of these events are required.27  In this study we argue that 
                                                             
26 Smith 2006. 
27 Gasiorowski 1995, 883. 
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HFRQRPLFFULVLVFRQVWLWXWHVDQHFHVVDU\FRQGLWLRQIRUGHPRFUDWLFWUDQVLWLRQEHFDXVHWKHHOLWH¶V
protection of their interest breaks both the provision pact between the regime and business 
interest and the social pact between the rich and the poor.  It provides an opening for 
political change by disrupting the balance of power (Boix and Svolik 2013).  Moreover, the 
effect of crisis on politics is moderated by economic structure.  In an economic structure 
with a higher share of state economy, on the one hand, economic crisis becomes more 
politically relevant by making the authoritarian state liable for economic failures.  On the 
other hand, economic crisis inflicts a greater economic loss for both the business group and 
the mass within an economy heavily engaged by the state which in turn makes the former 
more likely to defect from the coalition with the regime, the latter more likely to rebel for 
regime change, and the two social classes are more likely to form cross-class alliance. 
This argument and analytical finding suggest that the engagement of the state in the 
economy is a double-edged sword for the authoritarian elites.  Their share in the economy 
certainly helps buttress their political authority and gain the resource to buy support from 
social forces for the regime.  However, their engagement with the economy is like a 
Faustian deal.  While the authoritarian regime can get favor from this deal in good times, it 
has to pay back with the fate of regime collapse when the economy turns bad.  To some 
extent, this is a doomed destiny for the authoritarian regime instead of an optional 
consequence the regime elites can avoid.  Given the self-interest of regime elites and the 
pressure to buy off political support, the authoritarian states have intrinsic need to engage 
themselves in the economy.  But it is the same economic involvement that puts their 
political rein in jeopardy. 
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For the broad literature of comparative democratization, this study implies the 
imperative to reconsider and bring back the role of the state into the analysis of economic 
origins of democracy by stressing the relevance of the economic engagement of the 
authoritarian states.  The conventional approach represented by the modernization theory 
treats the state (or it representatives, political elites) as the passive player that is to be 
influenced and transformed by social economic changes in which the state has no say.  More 
recent studies include the power interaction between elites and the mass in their theoretical 
analysis of democratization (Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).  These studies, 
however, did not differentiate between political elites and economic elites.  ³Elites´ is often 
used interchangeably with ³the rich.´  By doing so, they have not yet examined how the 
state players as an active and independent force can predetermine the nature of economic 
changes which in turn shapes the political outcome of economic changes.  In these theories, 
the preference for regime types of various groups is largely determined by broad social 
structural settings in which the state has no antecedent role.  Our theories and empirics 
suggest the otherwise.  The state or the political system by engaging itself in the economy 
sets a political economic context in which economic factors exert influence on political 
change.  Therefore, in the relationship between the economy and the politics, the causal 
direction is inherently intertwined. 
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1
Appendix 1: Formal Proof
The following proof shows that a sudden economic shock disrupts the existing equilibrium,
and with the authoritarian elites' having a higher share of state-owned assets, economic crises
are more likely to trigger coalition defection of the business class. Suppose that, when an
economic crisis occurs in a country, it aﬀects the masses and business class alike by decreasing
their respective income by λ. Due to the greater capability of political elites to protect returns
from the state economy, political elites suﬀer a lesser degree of loss. The political elites are
motivated and, at the same time, monopolize the political means to protect the returns when
crises occur. They can do so by either shrinking special beneﬁts for the business groups and
other social groups or raising the extent of economic extraction to continue to pay for political
support. The choices include an increase in the tax rate (e.g., Bolivia), the physical seizure
of land and private assets (e.g., Zimbabwe), or the reduction of subsidies for speciﬁc sections
of the economy (e.g., Burma, Iran). Political elites also can provide selective help for the
business in which they have vested economic interest, while ignoring most other business
groups. Starting in 1979, for instance, the Korean economy, particularly the manufacturing
sectors, was strongly hurt by crises. The government handpicked by military generals aided
only the large chaebols, from which politicians received kickbacks. The results included
large-scale bankruptcy of the owners of middle- and small-size businesses and subsequently
widespread protests.
It should be noted that political elites' gains from state assets are, by no means, insulated
from crises. Yet, as discussed above, they can use various tools to protect themselves or to
pass on the loss to societal groups. During economic crises, political elites are hurt dispro-
portionately less than are other groups. For the purpose of simpliﬁcation of the presentation
of our formal model, we set that economic crises do not aﬀect the income of political elites.
Mathematically, assuming that political elites suﬀer some but proportionally less loss from
crises than do other groups (e.g., a ρ portion of the loss of the masses, 0 < ρ < 1) will yield
2
the same result. In other words, the conclusion derived from the formal modeling does not
require that state assets are insulated from crises or political elites do suﬀer from economic
crises. In this appendix, we present the simpliﬁed model; the derivation of the more com-
plicated model where political elites also lose a share of income is not presented and can be
requested.
A. Provision Pact and Coalition Defection
Since an economic crisis decreases the income of the mass and business class by λ but does
not aﬀect that of the elites, we have the following expressions about per capita income for
elites and business class.
Before crisis:
ye (per capita income for the elites), ye = θ
δ
· y¯p + k; and
yb (per capita income for business groups), yb = 1−θ
1−δ
· y¯p + r.
After crisis:
yes (per capita income for the elites), ye = θ
δ
· y¯p + k; and
ybs (per capita income for business groups),
ybs =
[
(1− λ)1−θ
1−δ
· y¯p − λ
θ
1−δ
· y¯p
]
+
[
(1− λ)r − λ δ
1−δ
k
]
ybs = (1− λ)
(
1−θ
1−δ
· y¯p + r
)
− λ
1−δ
(θy¯p + δk).
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Based on a deﬁnition that democracy is where the median voter gets to decide the allocation
of resources, so that a democratic transition supported by the business class is the one in
which all members of the business class will conﬁscate all the previous state economy and
have the same per capita income after a successful defection. The defection constraint for
business class therefore is, the per capita business income after successful defection and after
discounting the defection cost (µ), will be higher than the per capita business income under
authoritarian coalition and without defection cost:
(1− µ)(yes + ybs) > ybs (1)
Inequality (9) is equivalent to:
(1− µ)
[(
θ
δ
· y¯p + k
)
+
(
1−θ
1−δ
· y¯p + r
)
(1− λ)
]
>
(
1−θ
1−δ
· y¯p + r
)
(1− λ)
(1− µ)
(
θ
δ
· y¯p + k
)
− µ
[(
1−θ
1−δ
· y¯p + r
)
− λ
1−δ
]
> 0
Multiply δ(1 − δ)g on both sides and rearrange, in addition to a positive portion, we can
show that,
(−µδy¯p + µδθy¯p − rµδ + rµδ
2 + λµδy¯p − λµδθy¯p + rλµδ − rλµδ
2) +
(θy¯ + µδθy¯p − µθy¯p − δθy¯p + kδ + kµδ
2 − kµδ − kδ2) > 0
To satisfy this inequality, the following three conditions are required:
1. 1− µ− δ > 0;
2. 2θ − 1 > 0; and
3. kδ − r(1− δ).
4
In sum, the three conditions suggest that as long as the coalition defection is not self-
destructive, the business class is motivated to break away from the existing coalition with
political elites.
Alternatively, the necessary condition for business class to break away from the coalition
with political elites can be derived by examining the aggregate income of the bussiness
class and elites. The aggregate income of political elites after crisis is, Y es = yesδNp =
θNpy¯p + kδNp. The aggregate income of business class is, Y
bs = ybs(1− δ)Np, which equals
to (1− λ)(1− θ)Npy¯p + (1− λ)(1− δ)Npr − λθNpy¯p − λδNpk.
Similarly, the defection constraint for business class is, the per capita business income after
successful defection, after discounting the defection cost, will be higher than the per capita
business income under authoritarian coalition and without defection cost:
(1− µ)
[
Y es+Y bs
(1−δ)Np
]
> Y
bs
(1−δ)Np
.
This is equivalent:
(1−µ) (θNpy¯p + kδNp)−µ [(1− λ)(1− θ)Npy¯p + (1− λ)(1− δ)Npr − λθNpy¯p − λδNpk] > 0,
which can be tranformed into,
(θ − µ)y¯p + (1− µ)kδ + µ(λy¯p − r + λr + δr) + µλδ(k − r) > 0
To satisfy this defection constraint for business class, the following two conditions are re-
quired:
1. µ < θ; and
2. λy¯p − r + λr + δr > 0 ⇔ λ >
(1−δ)r
y¯p+r
.
5
In sum, the two conditions suggest that as long as the coalition defection is not self-
destructive, the business class is motivated to break away from the existing coalition with
political elites.
To what extent is the share of the state-owned assets associated with the defection constraint
for business class? Our model suggests that higher shares of the state-owned assets make the
defection constraint for business class more binding. Suppose there are two countries that
are otherwise identical. Yet one has a larger privileged economy than another, G1 < G2. It
has been proved that the key condition for coalition defection is kδ − r(1− δ). For G1, the
condition for coalition defection therefore is k1δ − r1(1− δ), and k2δ − r2(1− δ) for G2.
It can be proved that k2δ − r2(1 − δ) is more likely to hold than k1δ − r1(1 − δ). This is
equivalent to prove,
(k2δ − k1δ)− [r2(1− δ)− r1(1− δ)] > 0
Mutiply Np on both sides, and we have,
(K2 −K1)− (R2 −R1) > 0
Since K > R, the above inequality holds. Therefore, when an economic crisis occurs, higher
share of state economy within an authoritarian country makes the business class defect more
likely.
B. Social Pact and Mass Rebellion
Similarly to the discussion of business defection, the rebellion constraint for the mass can be
obtained when the per capita income of mass after a successful revolt, after discounting the
6
cost of revolt (i.e., µm), is higher than the per capita mass income under the authoritarian
regime and without the cost of revolt:
(1− µm)(y
ms + yps) > yms (2)
This is equivalent to,
(1− µ)
[(
θ
δ
· y¯p + k
)
+
(
1−θ
1−δ
· y¯p + r
)
(1− λ) + 1−α
1−β
· y¯(1− λ)
]
> 1−α
1−β
· y¯(1− λ)
Multiply (1− δ)(1− θ)δ on both sides, we have,
(1 − µm)(1 − δ)(1 − β)θy¯p + (1 − µm)(1 − δ)(1 − β)kδ + (1 − µm)(1 − λ)(1 − θ)δy¯p
+ (1− µm)(1− δ)(1− λ)(1− β)δr − µm(1− δ)(1− λ)(1− α)δy¯p > 0 (3)
Compare the ﬁrst term (1 − µm)(1 − δ)(1 − β)θy¯p and the only negative term −µm(1 −
δ)(1− λ)(1− α)δy¯p on the left hand side. Given the model setups as well as no-catastrophe
condition for mass rebellion (i.e., 1− µm > µm), the following inequality holds,
(1− µm)(1− δ)(1− β)θy¯p − µm(1− δ)(1− λ)(1− α)δy¯p > 0 (4)
Moreover, Inequality (11) suggests that higher shares of the state-owned assets make revolt
constraint for the mass more binding. This is so because with the increase of the size of
privileged economy (i.e., with the rise k and r), the revolt constraint becomes more binding.
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C. Cross-Class Alliance between the Mass and Business Class
C.1 Inequality and cross-class alliance
The economic crisis will aﬀect the income inequality between the mass and business class.
The post-crisis inequality between the two is,
ηs =
Y bs
Y bs + Y ms
, (5)
where,
Y ms = yms(1− β)N = (1− α)(1− λ)Ny¯; and
Y bs = ybs(1− δ)Np = α(1− λ)(1− θ)Ny¯ − β(1− λ)(1− δ)Nr − αλθNy¯ − βδNkr.
Therefore,
ηs = (1−λ)(1−θ)Nαy¯+(1−λ)(1−δ)Nβr−λθNαy¯−λδkNβ
(1−λ)(1−θ)Nαy¯+(1−λ)(1−δ)Nβr−λθNαy¯−λδkNβ+(1−λ)(1−α)Ny¯
.
This is equivalent to,
ηs = Nαy¯−λNαy¯−θNαy¯+Nβr−λNβr−δNβr+λδNβr−λδkNβ
Ny¯−λNy¯−θNαy¯+Nβr−λNβr−δNβr−λδkNβ
.
The ﬁrst-order derivative test of ηs = f(λ) will reveal the relationship economic crisis to the
inequality between the business class and the mass. It can be proved that,
dηs
dλ
< 0. (6)
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In other words, as economic crisis increases in severity, inequality between business class and
the mass declines.
C.2 Cross-class alliance constraint
For cross-class alliance constraint, when after a crisis, the combined payoﬀ for cross-class
alliance is greater than the combined payoﬀ for the business class and the mass under the
authoritarian regime, given the cost of cross-class alliance (i.e., µc),
(1− µc)(1− λ)
Y
Nm +Nb
>
Y bs + Y ms
Nm +Nb
. (7)
It is known that,
Y ms = (1− α)(1− λ)Ny¯; and
Y bs = α(1− λ)(1− θ)Ny¯ − β(1− λ)(1− δ)Nr − αλθNy¯ − βδNkr.
Inequality (15) therefore can be transformed into,
β(1− µc)(1− λ)Ng + (1− µc)(1− λ)Ny¯ >
β [(1− δ)r − λg]N + {α(1− λ)(1− θ)Ny¯ + (1− α)(1− λ)Ny¯ − αλθNy¯}.
First, compare if β(1 − µc)(1 − λ)Ng > β [(1− δ)r − λg]N . This inequality is assured if
(1 − µc + λµc)g > (1 − δ)r ⇔ g >
(1−δ)r
1−µc+λµc
. This is true given the fact that r is a fraction
of g.
Second, compare the if,
9
(1− µc)(1− λ)Ny¯ > α(1− λ)(1− θ)Ny¯ + (1− α)(1− λ)Ny¯ − αλθNy¯.
This is equivalent to verify if,
1− µc − λ+ λµc > α− αλ− αθ + αθλ+ 1− α− λ+ αλ− αθλ.
Rearrange and we have, µc <
αθ
1−λ
. This indicates that as long as the cross-class alliance
cost is not prohibitively high, then the cross-class alliance constraint is binding, such that
the two classes have an incentive to engage in coalition against the authoritarian rule by the
political elites.
To what extent is the share of the state-owned assets associated with the cross-class alliance
constraint for the mass and business class? This can be answered by examining the ﬁrst
order w.r.t. k of Inequality (15), which is equivalent to,
β(1− µc)(1− λ)Ng + (1− µc)(1− λ)Ny¯ >
β [(1− δ)r − λg]N + {α(1− λ)(1− θ)Ny¯ + (1− α)(1− λ)Ny¯ − αλθNy¯}.
Take the ﬁrst order w.r.t. k, then we have,
(1− µc)(1− λ)Nβδ + λδNβ > 0.
This is greater than zero, which indicates that the higher the state economy the more binding
is the cross-class alliance constraint.
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Appendix 2: Summary Statistics
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Appendix 3: A List of Democratic Transitions
Democratic transition in this list is deﬁned as a change from democracyt−1=0 to democracyt=1.That
is, a country changes from an autocracy in the previous year to a democracy in the next
year. Democracy is measured by DD. The years after country names indicate t− 1 and t.
Argentina: 1972-1973; 1982-1983
Bangladesh: 1985-1986
Benin: 1990-1991
Bolivia: 1977-1978; 1981-1982
Brazil: 1984-1985
Burundi: 1992-1993; 2004-2005
Central African Republic: 1992-1993
Chile: 1989-1990
Congo Brazzaville: 1991-1992
Congo Kinshasa: 1991-1992
Cyprus: 1982-1983
Ecuador: 1978-1979; 2001-2002
El Salvador: 1983-1984
Fuji: 1991-1992
Ghana: 1978-1979; 1992-1993
12
Greece: 1973-1974
Guatemala: 1985-1986
Honduras: 1970-1971; 1981-1982
Hungary: 1989-1990
Indonesia: 1998-1999
Kenya: 1997-1998
South Korea: 1987-1988
Madagascar: 1992-1993
Malawi: 1993-1994
Mali: 1991-1992
Mexico: 1999-2000
Nepal: 1989-1990
Nicaragua: 1983-1984
Niger: 1992-1993; 1999-2000
Nigeria: 1978-1979; 1998-1999
Pakistan: 1987-1988
Panama: 1988-1989
Paraguay: 1988-1989
13
Peru: 1979-1980; 2000-2001
Philippines: 1985-1986
Poland: 1988-1989
Portugal: 1975-1976
Senegal: 1999-2000
Sierra Leone: 1995-1996; 1997-1998
Spain: 1976-1977
Sri Lanka: 1988-1989
Taiwan: 1995-1996
Thailand: 1974-1975; 1978-1979; 1991-1992
Turkey: 1982-1983
Uganda: 1979-1980
Uruguay: 1984-1985.
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Appendix 4: On the dependent variable and interpretation
of coeﬃcients
The choice of dichotomous dependent variable
In theory, we hold a binary conception of democracy. We are interested in the change from
autocracy to democracy (democratic transition), not the change from one level of democracy
(autocracy) to another. Accordingly, in the empirical model, we used a probit model (Markov
transition model) that has been widely used in the literature to estimate the probability of
change from autocracy to democracy. Both theory and empirical analysis therefore require
a dichotomous variable. We used DD as our primary measurement. In order to show the
robustness of our ﬁndings, we supplemented it with Polity IV. When scholars use Polity IV
but need a binary measurement, a common practice is to dichotomize it at the point 6. We
followed that practice in this research.
The interpretation of regression coeﬃcients
The model we used in this research, Markov transition model, is a dynamic probit model
estimates the probability of a country in a given year will be a democratic country, given
that this country was authoritarian in previous year.
From the primary analysis in Model 4, we can calculate the regression coeﬃcients (not trans-
formed) for each given value of government investment and obtain the following marginal
eﬀect graph.
15
-
1
0
1
2
3
Ef
fe
ct
 o
f E
co
no
m
ic 
Cr
ise
s 
on
 D
em
oc
ra
cy
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Level of State Economic Engagement
Figure 2. Marginal eﬀect of economic crises on democratic transition (Dependent variable:
the regression coeﬃcients of Model 4)
Substantively, this plot graphically presents the regression coeﬃcients at each value of govern-
ment investment. For instance, when state engagement at 10%, the coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant,
indicating that the eﬀect of crises is not signiﬁcant. When state engagement is at 40%, the
coeﬃcient is 0.41 and statistically signiﬁcant. This indicates that one unit increase in crisis
(i.e., change from no crisis to crisis) increases the Z-score of the predicted probability of
democracy by 0.41. When state engagement is at 80%, the coeﬃcient is 1.12 and signiﬁ-
cant. In this scenario, economic crises increase the Z-score of the predicated probability of
democracy by 1.12
Although we can interpret the statistical signiﬁcance and the sign of each coeﬃcient directly,
assessing the magnitude of the eﬀect is trick in probit models. Moreover, as noted by various
statisticians and political scientists, the estimation of coeﬃcients in nonlinear models with an
interaction eﬀect cannot be directly interpreted as in linear models. We therefore calculated
the predicted probability of democratic transition given a crisis (crisis changes from 0 to 1)
16
at each value of state engagement. That marginal eﬀect plot is presented in Figure 1 and its
substantive meaning is presented in text.
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Appendix 5. Robustness Check
In addition to including dummies for countries, years, regions, and decades, we examine
the robustness of our ﬁndings in various ways. First, we vary the measurement of the in-
dependent variable, economic crises. In Model 8 of Table 2, we use the negative values of
the two-year moving average of economic growth as the measurement to ensure that the
dichotomization does not cause distortion in results. In Model 9, we create a dichotomous
measure of crisis by recoding the three-year moving average of economic growth rate. Both
analyses yield a similar pattern in regard to the moderating eﬀect of state economic engage-
ment. We also alternate the measurement of the dependent variable, i.e., democracy. Polity
IV is one of the most popular measurements in the ﬁeld. Because our theory posits a binary
state of democracy, and our model is a probit model, we recode Polity IV into a dichoto-
mous measurement at 6. We will later conduct an analysis using the original continuous
measurement of Polity IV. This analysis of Model 10 conﬁrms the pattern that economic
crises are more likely to be positively associated with regime transition when the share of
the state economy is higher. As we argued in previous sections, we prefer to use the share of
government investment as the measurement of the economic engagement of the state because
it closely pertains to our theoretical argument. Nevertheless, we would like to show whether
the economic role of the state in a broader sense entails the same political consequence in
terms of its moderating eﬀect on the relationship between economic crises and democratic
transition. We thus change the measurement of state economic engagement and use a more
comprehensive indicator, the size of government, provided in EFW. Model 11 is the analysis
that uses this alternative measurement.
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Another problem with the measurement of public investment is that, in some cases, a large
share of income of political elites that shapes the calculation of political actors is not gen-
erated from investment in public sectors. To address this issue, in Model 12, we exclude
countries whose economy is heavily reliant on oil export. Oil is one of the most important
resources that generate revenues for the regime. Moreover, some scholars have argued that
oil-rich authoritarian regimes are less likely to collapse in economic crises (Smith 2006). Ex-
clusion of these countries helps to avoid bias. The analysis of both Model 11 and Model 12
conﬁrm the positive moderating eﬀect of the economic engagement of the state In this study,
we have addressed potential endogeneity issue in a variety of ways. First, the transition model
we use conditions the analysis of the current value of democracy on its previous value and
thus captures the dynamic process of the relationship between the dependent variable and
its covariates over time. Second, all independent variables, including state engagement and
its interaction with economic development, are lagged for one year. Nevertheless, there is
a potential issue of endogeneity between state engagement and economic crises as economic
crises often drive countries to intervene in the economy. To further address this issue, we
conduct an analysis, in Model 13, for country-year cases before 1990. We do so because the
value of state engagement does not change much for countries during the period 1970-1990.
This corresponds to the historical fact that most countries started their market liberalization
in late 1980s and early 1990s. While, theoretically, state engagement might be endogenous
to both economic crises and political democracy, the change in either economic situations or
political conditions has not yet caused signiﬁcant changes in the level of state engagement
during 1970 1990. The analysis, again, indicates the robustness of our ﬁndings revealed
in other models. As argued above, we chose a dynamic probit model because it ﬁts with
our theory. To show the robustness of our ﬁndings, however, in Model 14 and Model 15, we
conduct analysis using a regular panel method, a ﬁxed-eﬀects model. A Fixed-eﬀects model
also is useful to control for the country-speciﬁc eﬀect without losing too many cases. The
analysis of both models lends further support to the ﬁndings of the transition model. Again,
20
however, the ﬁndings revealed by the ﬁxed-eﬀects model are not directly relevant to our
theory since it does not estimate the transition from an autocratic regime to a democratic
one but, rather, the change from one level of democracy (or autocracy) to another level.
21
